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They are being hailed as the new Holy Grail of economic 
development. The success of special economic zones 
(SEZ) in general and specialized ones in particular 
(industrial and technology parks) in countries as diverse 
as Australia, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, 
Ireland, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and more recently, China; Korea; Taiwan, China; or 
Mauritius, has led several African leaders to launch new 
similar initiatives. This paper establishes a common point 
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of reference for those who believe in the virtues of SEZs, 
explains why the many existing ones have not delivered 
the expected outcomes, and summarizes the key issues on 
the agenda. It then suggests cluster-based industrial parks 
as the most effective tool for developing competitive 
industries and generating employment, and provides 
some practical guidance to development practitioners and 







CLUSTER-BASED INDUSTRIAL PARKS 




























JEL: D23, L16, O23, P45 
Key Words: Special economic zones, clusters, industrial parks, African industrialization 





I am grateful to Justin Lin, Shanta Devarajan, Janamitra Devan, and Ivan Rossignol for 





This  note  draws  lessons  learned  during  several  trips  to  East  Asia  (mainly  China,  Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and Laos) and Latin America (mostly Brazil) in recent months and uses insights from 
discussions with a broad range of government officials at various levels of responsibility, private 
sector  leaders,  academics,  and  civil  society  activists  to  provide  an  overview  of  the  issues, 
challenges, and opportunities for structural transformation in Africa. It also draws on recent work 
at the World Bank. 
 
Its purpose is to contribute to a successful implementation of the World Bank Africa Regional 
Strategy whose first pillar is about ―Competitiveness and Employment.‖ The paper is therefore 
intended to inform the debate over the design and management of industrial parks which are 
increasingly viewed as important vehicles for channeling foreign know-how and capital into 
African economies, bypassing all the many obstacles of domestic business environments, and 
fostering  the  continent‘s  industrialization.  The  success  of  special  economic  zones  (SEZ)  in 
general  and  specialized  ones  in  particular  (industrial  and  technology  parks)
1  in countries as 
diverse as Australia, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland,  Ireland, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and more recently, China; Korea; Taiwan, China; or Mauritius, has 
led several African leaders to launch new  similar initiatives. The paper establishes a common 
point of reference for those who believe in the virtues of SEZs , explains why the many existing 
ones have not delivered the expected outcomes, and summarizes the key issues on the agenda. It 
then suggests cluster-based industrial parks (CBIP) as the most effective tool for developing 
competitive industries and generating employment,
2 and provides some practical guidance to 




Africa‘s impressive growth performance of 5-6 percent over the past decade—despite the severe 
global economic downturn—still lacks  credibility, for at  least  two reasons: first,  beyond the 
stories  of  improved  macroeconomic  management  and  booming  commodity  prices,  living 
standards for most people have not improved fast enough and while poverty has been reduced by 
9 percentage points in ten years, 50 percent of the population was still considered poor in 2005; 
second, while large amounts of public spending have been devoted to education and primary 
enrolment has been quite rapid, learning outcomes have been disappointing, the pace of human 
capital  accumulation  slow,  and  some  90  percent  of  the  labor  force  is  still  trapped  in  low-
productivity activities (farm and household enterprises, informal sector). As a result, the 7-10 
million young people entering the labor force every year generally have no prospect for enjoying 
                                                           
1 The International Convention on the Harmonization and Simplification of Customs defines a free zone as a specific 
place in a country ―where any goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are 
concerned, as being outside the customs territory […] and not subject to the usual customs control.‖ (Annex D). Free 
zones have existed in various parts of the world for centuries, most notably in Gibraltar (1704) and Hong Kong 
SAR, China (1848). Modern special economic zones (SEZs) typically are located in a geographically delimited area 
(often secured), and host firms that are eligible for benefits, a separate customs area (duty free benefits) with 
streamlined procedures, and single management structure. Industrial parks can be broadly defined as a category of 
SEZs that provide specialized services to specific industries. 
2 Cluster-based industrial zones largely explain the success of garment, footwear, motorcycle, consumer electronics 
and other labor-intensive sectors in China and other East Asian economies. 3 
 
employment in the formal sector where they could make a decent living and hope to be part of 
the dynamics of industrial and technological upgrading that eventually brings prosperity. That is 
true even in countries that have recorded high growth rates but where the number of poor has not 
declined significantly.  
 
The need for sustained, inclusive growth has never been more urgent. The growth dividends have 
not materialized for many people, who are getting impatient. Fortunately, new opportunities for 
rapidly achieving more broadly shared economic success are on the horizon. Globalization and 
the continued progress of large emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, and a few 
others, are freeing up unprecedented possibilities for industrialization for low-income economies 
in Africa and elsewhere. The popular belief that economic progress in these large developing 
countries (China in particular) is hurting industrialization in lower-income regions such as Sub-
Saharan Africa is wrong. In a global economy of 7 billion consumers and counting, trade of 
manufacturing goods is not a zero-sum game. In fact, with the constantly enlarging global market 
for manufacturing goods, the ―pie‖ keeps growing bigger and any developing country could find 
its niche—provided that it specializes in the production of goods that are consistent with its 
comparative advantage and implement policies that ensure the rapid development of competitive 
domestic firms.  The upcoming  ―graduation‖ of large  emerging  economies  into high middle-
income status actually opens up new opportunities for Africa. Confronted with the challenge of 
rising wages, even for unskilled workers, these successful middle-income countries will soon 
become  uncompetitive  in  low-skilled,  labor-intensive  industries  that  have  driven  their  good 
economic  performance  and  will  be  forced  to  either  relocate  such  activities  in  lower-wage 
countries, move up the value chain, or switch to more complex and capital intensive industries 
where they still have comparative advantage. It is estimated for instance that China alone may 
have to relinquish most of its current 85 million manufacturing jobs (Lin 2011a).  
 
African  countries  are  well  placed  to  seize  the  benefits  of  such  a  once-in-a-generation 
opportunity.  In  order  to  do  so,  they  must  organize  themselves  to  fill  at  least  some  of  the 
industrial  void  that  China,  India,  Brazil  and  others  will  leave  behind  as  they  move  up  the 
industrial  and  technological  ladder.  It  is  therefore  important  to  identify  the  policy  and 
institutional  constraints  that  must  be  removed  for  their  industrialization  strategy  to  be 
implemented. 
 
3. RATIONALE FOR CLUSTER-BASED INDUSTRIAL PARKS 
 
The  traditional  policy  advice  given  to  African  countries  by  the  World  Bank  and  most 
development institutions is to get their macroeconomic policies right and improve their business 
environment through microeconomic, sectoral and institutional reforms. The pertinence of such 
advice is undisputable. But evaluation studies often show that many countries have not followed 
that advice, often because it would have required engaging some politically difficult reforms. 
Even some of those that have followed it have not been able to accelerate and sustain inclusive 
growth of the type observed in  the truly successful countries  identified in  the 2008  Growth 
Report.
3 While growth rates of 5-6 percent are certainly remarkable, they are insufficient to bring 
                                                           
3 The report identified some of the distinctive characteristics of 13 high-growth economies that have been able to 
grow at more than 7 percent for periods of more than 25 years since World War II. The list includes: Botswana; 4 
 
poverty  levels  to  tolerable  levels  given  Africa‘s  current  high  inequality  and  elasticity  rates. 
Moreover,  they  have  not  created  enough  decent  jobs—meaning  formal  sector  jobs  with  the 
potential  for  increased  productivity.  Some  countries  such  as  Uganda,  Tanzania,  Rwanda  or 
Ghana have managed to create formal sector jobs at a rate greater than GDP growth but they 
started from such a small base that these efforts are still not quite visible. Most people there and 
elsewhere  on  the  continent  are  working  in  the  informal  sector,  in  farms  and  household 
enterprises,  often  with  less  than  subsistence  earnings—defined  as  $2/day.  This  is  hardly 
surprising: growth is often driven by consumption and public investment, not by private sector 
investment, which makes it neither sustainable nor inclusive (increases in consumption benefits 
the  richest  quintiles  disproportionately).  The  problem  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  most 
workers also lack skills: in low-income African countries half the existing labor force and one-
third  of  the  new  entrants  have  not  finished  primary  school.  In  addition,  investment  climate 
reforms  by  themselves  do  not  necessarily  translate  into  higher  investment  that  provides 
opportunities for growth and poverty reduction. 
 
The big question on Africa‘s economic agenda is therefore how to foster the type of private 
sector development that will result in the creation of viable, competitive firms, in which workers 
(unskilled or educated) also get the skills that help them prepare for the constantly changing 
demands  of  the  global  economy.  Recent  reassessment  of  the  effectiveness  of  various 
development strategies suggests that economic development is a process of continuous industrial 
and technological upgrading in which any country, regardless of its level of development, can 
succeed if it develops industries that are consistent with its comparative advantage (Lin 2011b).  
 
Shifting a poor economy‘s resources out of traditional agriculture and other low-productivity 
primary activities, and expanding the ―modern‖ sectors (including non-traditional agriculture), 
have always  been at  the core of the sustained productivity  gains  that characterize economic 
development. Besides the generally much higher levels of productivity in manufacturing than in 
traditional agriculture, the main reason for the growth in industrialization is the fact that its 
potential is virtually unlimited, especially in an increasingly globalized world. As agricultural or 
purely extractive activities expand, they usually face shortages of land, water, or other resources. 
By contrast, manufacturing easily benefits from economies of scale: thanks to new inventions 
and technological development, and to changes in global trade rules, transport and unit costs of 
production have declined substantially during the past decades. Today, almost any small African 
country can access the world market, find a particular niche, and establish itself as a global 
manufacturing place. For example, Qiaotou and Yiwu, two once small remote Chinese villages, 
have become powerhouses, producing more than two-thirds of the world‘s buttons and zippers, 
respectively. 
 
Only in rare circumstances such as extraordinary abundance of land or resources have countries 
succeeded in developing without industrializing. In fact, even big resource-rich countries such as 
Canada,  Australia,  Russia,  or  the  United  States  have  all  performed  well  because  of  the 
development  of  substantial  and  dynamic  manufacturing  sectors.  While  employment  in 
manufacturing as a share of total employment has fallen sharply in most advanced economies in 
the past decades, in real terms, the share of domestic expenditure on manufactured goods has 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Brazil; China; Hong Kong SAR, China; Indonesia; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; Malta; Oman; Singapore; Taiwan, 
China; and Thailand. 5 
 
remained stable. In other words, that phenomenon of deindustrialization is essentially the result 
of higher productivity in manufacturing than in services—and therefore a sign of successful 
economies. 
 
The crucial role of structural transformation as the fundamental driver/and result of sustained 
economic  growth  has  been  intensively  studied.  Using  a  three-sector  model,  Kuznets  (1966) 
documented some important aspects of structural transformation and the emergence of ―modern 
economic growth‖. He also highlighted the dynamics of institutions and infrastructures—an idea 
that  can  be  traced  back  to  Marx.  Kuznets  observed  in  his  Nobel  Lecture  that  ―advancing 
technology is the permissive source of economic growth, but it is only a potential, a necessary 
condition, in itself not sufficient. If technology is to be employed efficiently and widely, and, 
indeed,  if  its  own  progress  is  to  be  stimulated  by  such  use,  institutional  and  ideological 
adjustments must be made to effect the proper use of innovations generated by the advancing 
stock of human knowledge.‖  
 
Technological upgrading and innovation are indispensible ingredients for long-run productivity 
growth. They generally involve externalities and coordination issues that, if unaddressed, often 
lead  to  too  low  a  rate  of  technological  upgrading  and  require  some  form  of  government 
intervention.  But  sometimes  the  government  intervention  itself  leads  to  low  technological 
upgrading,  especially  in  countries  where  institutions  are  weak.  Globalization  has  enhanced 
developing countries' access of to the flow of new ideas and new technologies yet many African 
countries have not exploited the benefits of backwardness. They have failed to do so not simply 
because of structural barriers such as poor education and infrastructure but because governments 
either  attempted  to  too  much,  as  under  the  old  structuralist  policies,  or  too  little  under 
Washington  Consensus  policies  that  recommended  total  reliance  in  the  market  system.  Had 
government played their facilitating role judiciously to foster structural transformation, African 
economies would have performed well--even with poor education and infrastructure. 
 
However, these broad insights do not provide answers to some major policy questions still on the 
intellectual agenda (Monga 2011 and forthcoming): What determines the dynamics of sector 
contributions to growth? How does the capital intensity of sectors evolve over time – within and 
across countries?  Do changes in capital intensity reflect differences across cohorts of firms (e.g. 
new firms are more capital intensive), the adjustment of incumbent firms, or the exit of less 
productive and less capital intensive firms?  What factors help and hinder the reallocation of 
resources, and how do they reflect the policy environment? How to organize the adaptation and 
adoption of known technologies in African countries? What should be the respective roles of the 
government and the private sector? What institutional arrangements are necessary to support 
structural transformation, especially in the African context where long-term financing is scarce? 
How to ignite industrialization and promote backward linkages and structural transformation?  
 
Economic development is a continuous process of structural transformation involving industrial 
and  technological  upgrading  and  diversification.  It  requires  continuous  and  coordinated 
upgrading of soft (or intangible) and hard (or tangible) infrastructures. For African countries—
and all developing countries in general—it is therefore essential that economic policies be geared 
towards  the  changing  patterns  of  industrial  structure  and  technology  diffusion,  and  the 
consequences of alternative methods of industry selection, choice of production bundles and 6 
 
modernization and innovation strategies, as well as the existing distortions and other aspects of 
governance in the country. For all of the world‘s poorest countries, the challenge of sustained 
economic growth and development basically boils down to whether they are able to break into 
global industrial markets and find their own niche, or organize their economies to take advantage 
of the opportunities being vacated by middle-income countries that are forced out of their niche 
because of rising wages, rising productivity levels, and the need for industrial upgrading. 
 
From that perspective, it appears that by following carefully selected lead countries in the so-
called  ―flying-geese‖  pattern,  some  latecomers  in  that  process  can  exploit  the  advantage  of 
backwardness and build up industries that are growing dynamically in more advanced countries 
with  endowment  structures  similar  to  theirs.  The  flying-geese  pattern  has  served  well  all 
successfully catching up economies since the 18
th century. As noted in Lin and Monga (2011), 
historical evidence shows that all countries that have successfully transformed from agrarian to 
modern advanced economies – both the old industrial powers of Western Europe and North 
America, and the newly industrialized economies of East Asia – have had governments that 
played a pro-active role in assisting individual firms in overcoming the inevitable co-ordination 
and externality problems. In fact, the governments in high-income countries today continue to do 
so.  However, it must be acknowledged that almost every government in the developing world 
has attempted, at some point, to play that facilitating role, but most have failed. These pervasive 
failures are mostly due to government inability to come up with good criteria for identifying 
industries appropriate for a given country‘s endowment structure and level of development. In 
fact, government propensity to target industries that are too ambitious and not aligned with a 
country‘s  comparative advantage largely explains why their attempts  to  ‗pick winners‘ have 
resulted in ‗picking losers.‘ 
 
There is not a single successful economy in the world that does not rely on industrial policy. 
Developed-country  governments  continue  to  adopt  various  measures  to  support  industrial 
upgrading  and  diversification,  even  though  these  policies  may  not  be  announced  under  the 
formal label of ‗industrial policy‘. Besides patent systems, which are industry-neutral, other such 
measures typically include support for basic research, mandates, allocation of defense contracts 
and large public procurements. Local governments also often provide all kinds of incentives to 
private firms to attract them to particular geographic areas and induce new investments. The 
application of all these measures needs to identify specific industries or products and amounts to 
‗picking winners‘. 
 
SEZs have often been used effectively by some latecomers such as Ireland; Korea; Mauritius; 
Taiwan, China; or China, to emulate leader countries and even catch up with them in the race to 
economic prosperity. The well-known rationale for SEZs in developing countries is to provide 
special policy incentives and infrastructure in a circumscribed geographic location to firms that 
can  attract  foreign  direct  investment,  create  jobs,  develop  and  diversify  exports  (even  when 
economy-wide business environment problems and protective barriers are not yet resolved) and 
foreign  exchange  earnings,  and  serve  as  ―experimental  laboratories‖  for  new  pricing,  labor, 
financial or labor policies. The ultimate expectation is that the knowledge spillovers of these 
experiments eventually translate into private sector development, sustained growth, productivity 
increases, and other financial and economic benefits for the entire economy. Policy incentives in 
SEZs  typically  include  import  and  export  duty  exemptions,  streamlined  customs  and 7 
 
administrative controls and procedures, facilitated access to foreign exchange and relatively low 
income tax rates. Export-oriented SEZs are generally intended to ―convey ‗free trade status‘ to 
export manufacturers, enabling them to compete in global markets and counterbalance the anti-
export bias of trade policies.‖ (FIAS 2008: 12) 
 
Unfortunately, most countries that have created SEZs have not gained the expected benefits. 
African countries in particular have faced two main constraints that have prevented private sector 
development to take place through SEZs: high factor costs and high transaction costs (often 
compounded by political capture and rent seeking). The good news is that careful analysis of 
previous SEZs experiences and lessons from economic history and economic theory can shed 
light on the reasons for failure. Taking these lessons into account, African policymakers can 
rethink the way they design and operate SEZs and derive big gains from them.  
 
High factor costs can be addressed only if economic development strategies are fully consistent 
with a country‘s comparative advantage so that the factor which is in relative abundance is used 
extensively. This requires that the industries selected and attracted into SEZs are primarily those 
that make good use of low-skill labor, are competitive, and quickly establish effective backwards 
linkages with the rest of the domestic economy.
4 The removal of the second constrain t—high 
transaction costs—necessitates the development of large numbers of firms in industries where 
economies  of  scale,  intra-industry  knowledge  spillovers,  ―forward  and  backward‖  linkages,
5 
good supply chain/ logistics, and other agglomeration effects can be achieved. In other words, 
the development of cluster-based industrial parks (CBIPs) in particular can yield big economic 
and social payoffs to African and other developing countries, assuming all the other constraints, 
such as those that led to high factor costs, have been removed. 
 
The reasons for that can be found in both economic theory and empirical analyses. Clusters or 
industrial  agglomeration  arise  in  situations  where  there  are  industry-specific  and  local 
externalities  (the  so-called  Marshallian  externalities),  which  may  justify  policy  interventions 
(Rodriguez-Clare 2005;  Harrison  and Rodriguez-Clare 2010). Empirical studies  of economic 
diversification also provide important insights for the development of CBIPs. Recent research 
has shown that poor economies with more diversified economies tend to have higher levels of 
income  per  capita.  Sectoral  diversification  in  early  stages  of  development  is  generally 
accompanied by  geographic  agglomeration.  In  the words  of  Imbs  and  Wacziarg (2003), the 
range of industries expands and factors are allocated increasingly equally across sectors. At the 
same  time,  new  sectors  tend  to  localize  in  specific  regions.  Regions  become  increasingly 
different.  Such  trends  typically  hold  until  countries  reach  an  income  level  of  approximately 
US$9,000 per capita, after which higher levels of income per capita are then associated with 
increased  specialization.  In  fact,  sectoral  concentration  in  later  stages  of  development  is 
accompanied  by  geographic  de-agglomeration.  The  range  of  activities  produced  across  all 
regions is reduced and the location of economic activities seems to matter much less. 
 
                                                           
4 That did not happen in the previous rounds of industrial and SEZs policies for several reasons discussed in Section 
4 below. 
5 Backward linkages can be defined as the various channels through which money, goods, services, and information 
flow between a firm and its suppliers and create a network of interdependence and mutually beneficial business  
opportunities. Forward linkages are similar connections between a firm and its customers. 8 
 
The  location  of  production  is  of  particular  importance  as  it  allows  for  (or  impedes) 
agglomeration externalities, a key element for improving productivity and exploiting economies 
of scale (World Bank 2009). Manufacturing in particular can reap economies of scale through 
geographic concentration. ―This is most obvious at the plant level: the very idea of a plant is to 
bring  machinery  and  workers  together  in  a  single  location.  However,  it  also  applies  to  the 
location of firms engaged in the same activity. By clustering together, similar firms reduce each 
other‘s costs.‖ (Unido 2009: xv). Clustering also helps firms lower their transaction costs and 
expand. 
 
4. WHY MOST AFRICAN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES FAILED 
 
The renewed enthusiasm about SEZs and the potential of cluster-based industrial parks should 
not preclude the need to understand why most attempts in Sub-Saharan Africa have failed to 
deliver their promises. In fact, several African countries such as Senegal and Liberia launched 
free zones in the early 1970s, with little success. In 2008, it was estimated that the region had a 
total of 114 zones, of which 65 were private (FIAS 2008:18). At the same time, there were 
already about 3,000 zones in 135 countries worldwide, accounting for some 68 million direct 
jobs and over $500 billion of direct trade-related value added. The direct benefits expected from 
export  growth  and  export  diversification,  employment  and  income  generation,  foreign  direct 
investment, foreign exchange and government earnings generally appear to have been negligible. 
The  indirect  benefits  (indirect  job  creation,  technology  transfer,  knowledge  spillovers, 
managerial know-how, skills upgrading, etc.), which are more difficult to assess because of their 
dynamic nature, have generally also been rather limited (Farole 2011).  
 
In most countries, the benefit-cost ratio for setting up and running SEZs has been disappointing: 
personal income tax on employment, permit fees and services charges, sale and rental fees on 
public  land  to  developers,  import  duties  and  taxes  on  products  from  the  zones  sold  to  the 
domestic customs territories, concession fees for facilities such as ports or power plants, and 
corporate income tax (when assessed) totaled only negligible amounts. In the meantime, import 
duties and charges lost from the smuggling opportunities created by SEZs, tax revenue forgone 
from firms relocating from the domestic customs territory into the zones, public investment for 
(often untargeted) infrastructure and recurrent expenditures (mainly the wage bill of public sector 
workers  needed  to  run  and  regulate  the  zones)  often  represented  substantial  costs  to 
governments. 
 
Looking in retrospect at the reasons for their generally weak performance, one can point to a 
variety of factors ranging from poor institutional design and management of the initial concept to 
ineffective macro and microeconomic policies, which often created major distortions and led to 
failure. The objectives of these zones were often not clearly articulated or unrealistic, and the 
policy tools for achieving them inconsistent. 
 
The industries attracted to the zone sometimes defied the country‘s comparative advantage and 
were  therefore  not  viable  without  a  strong  set  of  protection  policies.  In  most  instances, 
policymakers either identified those industries that they wanted to favor for personal reasons, or 
they did not actively attempt to identify which particular industries may be most suited to their 
country‘s endowment structure (i.e., labor-intensive industries). They assumed that any foreign 9 
 
firm that would be willing to join the zone would create some jobs, which would be better than 
nothing…  One  consequence  of  the  absence  of  identification  strategies  was  the  random 
mushrooming  of  small  single  firms  from  very  different  types  of  industries.  Naturally, 
governments  could  not  provide  them  with  the  industry-specific  infrastructure  support  they 
needed. 
 
Many  zones  were  exclusively  developed,  regulated  and  operated  by  governments  or  public 
entities.  Beyond  the  obvious  issues  of  expertise  and  capacity,  that  type  of  institutional 
arrangement often led to conflict of interest situations, with regulatory agencies also engaged in 
zone development activity, especially when public zones compete with private firms outside the 
zone. 
 
Policies  and  privileges  in  the  zone  were  severely  restricted,  at  least  in  theory.  Access  to  a 
generous set of privileges was often controlled by a small group of civil servants. The criteria for 
selecting  qualifying  firms  were  not  always  transparent.  And  when  it  was,  it  seemed  too 
restrictive, as firms typically had to export at least 80 percent of their production. Merchandises 
that  could  be  introduced  duty-  and  tax-free  by  registered  enterprises  or  individuals  were 
restricted to direct inputs for manufacturing. Such regulations were often the source of rents. 
 
The choice of the location was not always optimal. While some zones were built in port cities 
that were already growth poles or near transport hubs, others were created as isolated geographic 
enclaves or in remote areas, not on the basis of an economic rationale but as a way of appeasing 
political constituencies. This increased production and transaction costs for the few firms willing 
to  build  factories  there.  Such  problems  are  likely  to  arise  again  if  appropriate  precautions 
discussed below are not taken in the design of new zones. 
 
Reducing transaction costs was not part of the strategic focus. Because of the randomness in 
industry selection and the limited government financial resources, even basic infrastructure was 
not  made  available  in  many  of  these  zones.  Governments  did  not  proactively  play  their 
indispensible facilitating role: they did not provide some basic industry-specific infrastructure 
and often waited (in vain) for qualifying firms to finance investment in electricity, water, or 
telecommunication within the zone. They did not coordinate the design and implementation of 
the investment needed and used collectively by firms in their industries (storage facilities for 
example). Again in retrospect, it may have been beneficial to public finance that governments 
did not spend even more money financing sub-optimal and unprofitable infrastructure. 
 
As shown in investment climate surveys carried out in Africa, government officials  running 
SEZs  also  did  not  realize  that  successful  integration  into  the  world  economy  increasingly 
requires  the  realization  of  behind-border  measures  that  fall  under  the  heading  of  trade 
facilitation. They failed to alleviate the burden of red tape and provide the type of efficient 
services such as customs and port efficiency. In countries such as Senegal (where an SEZ was 
established as early as 1974) or Cameroon, it often took more than a year for a foreign firm to 
obtain necessary permits to operate. They also had to deal with heavy and complex bureaucratic 
rules and procedures, a very high cost of infrastructure (communications, energy, water), and 
constraining labor regulations. In addition, they had to agree to unrealistic job creation goals and 
high requirements for initial investment. In many other African countries, qualifying firms that 10 
 
managed  to  join  SEZs  still  had  serious  difficulties  accessing  foreign  exchange  and  to  other 
financial services. 
 
Because of their poor design, ineffective management and misguided policies, most SEZs did not 
attract enough firms in competitive industries. Moreover, their firms did not generate enough 
backward linkages  with  local  suppliers and sub-contracting business  relationships  with other 
local enterprises. Too often, local firms either had no interest in supplying SEZs-based firms or 
they failed to meet world market standards for quality, price, and delivery times. SEZs-based 
firms themselves tended to use domestic factors and inputs only in limited extent and condemned 
themselves  to  remain  small  enclaves  in  African  economies.  Given  the  often  inappropriate 
strategic focus of these zones (where a few firms often benefited from lucrative special deals 
with  influential  politicians  and  could  afford  to  produce  the  wrong  goods  in  otherwise 
uncompetitive  factories),  the  fact  that  they  remained  enclaves  limited  exacerbation  of  the 
economy-wide distortions. However, disconnect with the domestic private sector worsened their 
perception by local business people. In some cases, the poor logistics and weak supply chain 
(both a reflection of limited clustering) led these firms to rely heavily on imports (with industries 
such as electronics or even apparel often showing imports ratios well over 60 percent); is such 
situations,  currency  devaluations  compounded  the  distortion  of  net  exports.  As  a  result, 
transaction costs remained too high. Even with distortive protection by governments, they failed 
to yield enough business volume to be credible entities. 
 
5. MOVING FORWARD: GUIDANCE FOR POLICYMAKING  
 
CBIPs can only be successful in Sub-Saharan Africa if the issues discussed above, which led to 
the failure of most SEZs, are addressed effectively. In addition, specific concerns from foreign 
investors (Chinese, Brazilians and others) as well as from various domestic constituencies in 
each country (mainly small businesses and trade unions) should be dealt with in a manner that 
does not perpetuate the failures of the past. 
 
Key Issues to be Addressed 
 
Investors in East Asia and Latin America who have potential interest in participating in CBIPs in 
Africa also have good reasons to consider such a move: they understand the need to upgrade 
their business models and processes, move up the value chain, and relocate their labor-intensive 
activities either in their own country‘s provinces where wages are 30 percent lower (but likely to 
rise), or preferably in lower-income countries where the challenge of rising wages is not yet 
daunting.   
 
According to these investors, five big issues stand in the way and African policymakers must 
work to remove them: 
 
  The frequency and intensity of economic policy reversals in some African countries is 
still perceived to be high, which makes long-term business decisions and commitment 
difficult and particularly risky. 
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  The  poor  state  of  infrastructure,  which  increases  input  and  transaction  costs  to  non-
competitive levels; and the poor logistics and supply chain for intermediate inputs, which 
are essential ingredients for firm competitiveness. 
 
  The difficulty of securing land for mass production activities. 
 
  The  often  poor  quality  of  public  service  delivery,  which  reflects  a  poor  business 
environment; the rigidity of labor laws in some countries and inefficiency of business 
practices/culture. 
 
  Political economy and governance issues in many African countries: the misuse of SEZs 
by  a  few  well-connected  business  people  to  circumvent  tax  laws;  this  often    led  to 
opposition by small business owners. 
 
  Critics of SEZs in developing countries have also often argued that they tend to only 
attract  polluting  industries  and  import-dependent  activities  that  perpetuate  low-skill 
assembly activities with low value-added. It is also often said that firms within these 
zones are generally granted permission to suppress basic labor rights, pay low wages and 
to  escape  from  regulations  on  workplace  health  and  safety  conditions.  Lessons  from 
successful  SEZs  show  that  once  they  attract  a  large  cluster  of  firms  in  assembly,  it 
becomes possible to localize the production of intermediate inputs, which in general are 
more capital-intensive and have larger economies of scale. Successful SEZs have also 
moved to make their policies and business practices consistent with ILO and WTO rules. 
 
Generating Win-Win Opportunities: A Basic Checklist 
 
In order to address all these issues and embark successfully on the path to the industrial and 
technological  upgrading  that  leads  to  sustainable  growth  and  create  jobs,  African  countries 
should  expand  the  scope  of  privileges  of  their  zones,  and  remove  the  distortions  and 
inefficiencies that have characterized them. They should consider building SEZs with specialized 
facilities that are configured to the needs of specific industries and sectors. Such cluster-based 
industrial parks (CBIP) could be of various sorts depending on the particular industries to be 
promoted,  which  should  be  consistent  with  the  country‘s  revealed  or  latent  comparative 
advantage.
6 With their specialized facilities customized to the unique needs of target industries, 
they may be airport-based zones to support air -based activities (fruits and vegetables or cut -
flower exports for instance), agro-processing, or even simply financial services zones aiming  at 
promoting off-shore activities. 
 
                                                           
6 CBIPs should not try to promote static comparative advantage. They should support for the upgrading and 
diversification into new industries. However, their goals should not be too ambitious as it is often the case in 
countries where policymakers advocate the promotion of dynamic comparative advantage. The nuance here is 
important. Theories of dynamic comparative advantage typically attempt to help firms to enter industries that are a 
country‘s future comparative advantage. Because of endowment constraints in the African context, firms in those 
industries would not yet be viable in a competitive market even if the government helped them with the co-
ordination and externality compensation. By contrast, CBIPs should aim at helping firms enter industries with latent 
comparative advantage. Under that scenario, firms would be immediately viable and require no subsidies or 
protection once the government provides co-ordination and externality compensation. 12 
 
Good general principles 
 
The  industries  undertaken  in  CBIPs  should  be  carefully  selected  and  consistent  with  each 
country‘s revealed or latent comparative advantage to ensure that they make the best possible use 
of the abundant factor (typically low-skilled labor) and can become competitive in international 
markets without excessive forms of government protection.
7 At least in their initial phase, they 
should host in labor-intensive, assembly-oriented activities such as  textiles, apparel, footwear, 
electrical  and  electronic  goods.  Within  such  industries,  the  scope  of  activities  should  be 
expanded  to  include  not  only  manufacturing  and  processing  but  also  commercial  and 
professional services such as warehousing or transshipment. 
 
All investors (foreign and local) should be treated equally. New legislation, rules and regulation 
should therefore be adopted to reduce the probability of distortions in incentives. Moreover, 
there should be a unique set of fiscal incentives for al l promoted industries, regardless of their 
location  (within  the  zone  or  outside).  Never  before  have  African  political  leaders  been 
confronted with the difficult sociopolitical challenges posed by increasingly large, demanding, 
and (often) educated crowds.  In fact, it has become very costly to remain in power without 
delivering tangible results, especially on the employment front. With the emergence of a new, 
more pragmatic leadership across the continent, policymakers are much more likely to pay more 
attention to electoral cycles and be more accountable for their economic policy choices. 
 
Deliberate efforts should be made to integrate CBIPs into national economies. In order to 
preempt the inevitable domestic criticism, social fears and political economy issues, the strategic 
focus of CBIPs should be on generating manufacturing jobs and absorbing large segments of the 
low-skill labor force; promoting skill, industrial, and technological upgrading
8; improving the 
economy‘s endowment structure and moving towards higher-value activities but at a realistic 
pace; encouraging linkages between CBIPs-based firms and local firms so that the zones provide 
demonstration effects for success and serve as catalysts to broader reforms; and compliance with 
ILO labor standards. It is indeed important to communicate the message that for most people in 
the labor force across the continent of Africa, the alternative to employment in such CBIPs 
would be low-productivity, low-income informal activities, underemployment in urban areas, 
unprofitable and highly risky agricultural work in rural areas, unemployment, and the perpetual 
trap of poverty. Even with low levels of formal education, many unskilled workers could still be 
employed in CBIPs that specialize in basic assembly operations. 
 
Effective institutional arrangements 
 
CBIPs that are privately-owned, managed, and operated should be encouraged. But they could 
start as public-private partnerships, with public provision of off-site infrastructure such as roads 
and public-private funding of on-site facilities. Governments can provide direct financial support 
                                                           
7 In setting the strategic focus of the old SEZs, most African governments clearly did not follow the rigorous 
prescription suggested here and there is guarantee they will do so now. Moreover, in a second-best world, it is easy 
to argue that almost any industry needs a subsidy. A good indication of whether policymakers are serious about 
creating CBIPs with competitive potential will be their choice of industries. 
8 It is estimated that SEZs in Sub-Saharan Africa generally contribute nearly 50 percent of exports. It can be inferred 
from their impact on the diversification of the region‘s export base that they also contribute to skill upgrading. 13 
 
or guarantees to build infrastructure and facilities in the zone. Private sector participation can 
take many different forms: basic partnership with shared risks and rewards with governments; 
concession  agreements;  ―build-own-operate,‖  ―build-operate-transfer,‖  or  ―build-own-operate-
transfer‖  arrangements  (see  FIAS  2008).  Successful  models  of  CBIPs  include  a  variety  of 
contract types, often with public-private partnerships that evolve over time. A model that has 
been popular recently involves ―equity-shifting‖ arrangements, with a private contract manager 
of a government zone being allows to exercise a purchase option once pre-defined levels of 
performance have been reached. 
 
Even well-designed CBIPs can only succeed if they are backed by strong political commitment 
from the highest levels of governments to improve the business environment and remove all 
quickly  remove  all  the  obstacles  that  may  stand  in  the  way  of  implementation.  A  good 
institutional  framework  for  preparation  could  be  an  inter-ministerial  committee  headed  by  a 
political ―champion‖ who has the credibility and power to make things happen. That ―champion‖ 
should  also  be  the  main  interface  between  CBIPs  developers  and  firms  and  all  government 
entities.  He/she  should  be  able  to  respond  quickly  and  effectively  to  the  requests  from  the 
business  community.  But  he/she  should  be  insulated  from  political  pressures  to  please  any 
domestic political constituency. 
 
Facilities and services 
 
African  policymakers  should  work  closely  with  private  sector  operators  to  fully  equip  and 
service CBIPs with purpose-build facilities, which can then be put up for sale or lease.  The 
provision of industry-specific on-site infrastructure is an important determinant of transaction 
costs and competitiveness. It helps attract firms and facilitate the clustering and the development 
of  sub-contracting  relationships  among  them.  Private  zone  developers  should  be  allowed  to 
supply utilities services (water, power, sewerage, and telecommunications) to CBIP firms. As 
governments across Africa continue to need substantial private sector financing for infrastructure 
projects, attention should turn to the region's still underdeveloped capital markets as a potential 
channel for fund-raising. The creation of an effective municipal bond market in the region and 
other  innovative  public-private  solutions  to  fund  and  implement  key  infrastructure  projects 
should be the focus of  discussion.  International financial organizations  such as  the  IFC  and 
MIGA should also be involved. 
 
The development of CBIPs will be made easier if African governments are willing to find land 
parcels and secure titles for lease to private zone developers. In many African countries, the legal 
framework allows for an enduring influence of the state bureaucracy on land distribution and 
land rights. Governments are reluctant to hand over the power resource of land distribution and 
state control is legitimized as historically and socially fair. Such control offers potential spaces 
for rents and bureaucratic arbitrariness. State ownership, and especially the power to redistribute 
land plots, makes citizens and business people vulnerable to arbitrary actions of local bureaucrats 
who decide about which individual is granted access to land. CBIPs represent a good opportunity 
for  implementing  land  reforms  gradually,  in  a  way  that  can  generate  quick  wins  to  all 
stakeholders and improve collective welfare. The fact that countries such as Ethiopia, with a long 
history of strong resistance to the privatization of land property rights to individual plot holders, 14 
 
are willing to consider changes in their land tenure policy, may be the sign of progress—and the 
recognition that there is no other viable alternative. 
 
In expanding the range of facilities and amenities available within CBIPs, public and private 
partners should consider not only industry-specific factories and infrastructure but also a wide 
array of services such as high-speed telecommunications and Internet services, common bonded 
warehouse facilities, training facilities, maintenance and repair centers, product exhibition areas, 
on-site customs clearance and trade logistics facilities, on-site housing, on-site banking, medical 
clinics, shopping centers, childcare facilities, etc. Developing a zone not as on stand-alone but 
rather  as  an  integrated  industrial,  commercial,  residential,  and  recreational  entity  allows 
developers to diversify their potential sources of revenue and offset the potential low profitability 
of certain activities with higher margins in others. In many well managed private zones in East 
Asia, as much as half of total annual revenue is derived from business support services and other 
sources of income. 
 
Political economy issues 
 
Political economy concerns are legitimate but only for the traditional type of SEZs which host 
firms in industries that defy comparative advantage. Firms in these industries are not viable in an 
open,  competitive  market.  Their  existence  and  continuous  operation  often  depend  on  large 
subsidies and protection, which create opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption, and make it 
difficult for the government to abandon interventions and exit from distortions. CBIPs are meant 
to  promote  a  completely  different  development  model:  the  promotion  of  industries  that  are 
consistent  with  the  economy‘s  latent  comparative  advantage.  Firms  are  viable  once  the 
constraints to their entry and operation are removed. The incentives provided by the government 
to the first movers are to be temporary and small, solely for the purpose of compensating for 
their  information  externality.  In  that  context,  the  issues  of  pervasive  rent-seeking  and  the 
persistence of government intervention beyond its initial timetable can be mitigated. Selecting 
labor-intensive  industries  with  economies  of  scale  (so  that  there  are  incentives  for  foreign 
investors to localize in Africa) and potential for upgrading (to open up future possibilities for 
domestic value-added creation) would generate the kind of quick wins that policymakers need to 
build their own domestic political capital and pursue reforms. 
 
It must also be noted that African countries are not all confronted with the most complex internal 
political economy problems that require the adoption of second- or third-best economic policies. 
In some countries, minimum wage and other labor laws are actually much less binding than they 
appear in the books. In such countries, especially those where basic transportation, energy, and 
telecommunication infrastructure could be improved quickly, CBIPs should be much bolder in 
their design and implementation to become ―freeports‖. Instead of being mainly export drivers, 
they  could  be  large  platforms  for  private  investment  and  catalysts  for  knowledge  spillovers 
throughout the entire national economy and beyond, and even serve as a basis for regional hubs 
in specific industries. In such countries, CBIPs—selected on the basis of their economic rationale 
and not for political considerations—could: 
 
  Cover much larger areas, therefore allowing greater flexibility to firms in their choice of 
plant location and opportunities for inter-firm linkages. 15 
 
 
  Allow full access to the domestic markets on a duty-paid basis—that is, lift the traditional 
requirement  of  exporting  80  percent  or  more  of  the  production,  and  allow  instead 
unrestricted sale to domestic consumers as long as all applicable import taxes and other 
duties are fully paid. 
 
  Allow firms to engage into any legal economic activity they deem profitable, including 
manufacturing, warehousing, transshipment, etc. Registered firms or individuals could 
also be offered duty-free privileges to permit the introduction of all types of merchandise, 
which can then be sold at the retail or wholesale level, or even consumed within the zone 
area.  
 
  Alternatively, African policymakers may consider best practices from Ireland; Taiwan, 
China; and Korea, and allow duty-free access to inputs for local firms just as it is the case 
for  CBIPs-based  firms.  Domestic  producers,  especially  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises, could then benefit from tax credit and rebates on duties paid on imported 
goods and services used in products sold to CBIPs-based firms. Local suppliers could 
then  import  intermediary  products  and  components  on  the  basis  of  letters  of  credit 
initiated  by  CBIPs-based  firms.  The  latter  could  also  provide  domestic  firms  with 
technical assistance or financing arrangements as part of sub-contracting arrangements. 
Such  policy  measures  aiming  at  fostering  backward  linkages  would  eventually  help 
diffuse political opposition to CBIPs. 
 
  Governments could work closely with firms in competitive industries to support training 
and  apprenticeship  for  workers,  promote  study  tours  and  personnel  exchanges,  and 
implement programs tailored for purchasing and technical managers of export-oriented 
firms based in CBIPs to help their local suppliers achieve high-quality standards and 
meet the required delivery times. By bringing local business leaders into the picture and 
creating the conditions for them to fully share the success of CBIPs, governments would 
foster job generation and weaken domestic sociopolitical resistance to the new policy 
(including from trade unions). 
 
  Finally,  political  commitment  at  the  highest  levels  of  government  should  be  clearly 
signaled  to  potential  foreign  investors,  who  must  be  convinced  all  constraints  on 
businesses in CBIPs will be removed quickly. Personal engagement by Presidents, Prime 
Ministers, and other high-level government officials in Africa will be needed to convey 
the message that one the policy is adopted, there will be no reversal. Well-prepared, well-
targeted (to specific industries) and well-advertized visits to countries where potential 
investors  are  (China,  India,  Brazil,  etc.)  would  help  overcome  skepticism  and  give 
credibility to the new policy. In preparation of such trips, African political leaders should 
anticipate on the main reasons for skepticism on the part of potential foreign investors; 
they should identify the big barriers to entry and be prepared to make a convincing case 
about their support to CBIPs. 
  
Economic  development  and  sustained  growth  are  the  result  of  continual  industrial  and 
technological upgrading, a process that requires public-private collaboration. Industrial policy 16 
 
defined broadly as any government decision, regulation or law that encourages ongoing activity 
or  investment  in  a  particular  industry,  is  an  integral  feature  of  any  successful  strategy.  By 
facilitating  co-ordination  and  addressing  externality  issues,  industrial  policy  can  help  many 
domestic  and  foreign  firms  to  enter  sectors  that  are  consistent  with  the  country‘s  latent 
comparative advantage and turn them into overt comparative advantages, and thereby intensifies 
competition within the industries and enhances the economy‘s competitiveness internationally. It 
certainly entails many risks of failure. But CBIPs provide a good framework for mitigating such 
risks. The adoption and implementation of the principles discussed above would allow African 
governments to address most of the concerns expressed by potential foreign investors and by 
local business leaders. Reliance on rigorous and transparent selection criteria for the location of 
CBIPs and their strategic focus, together with a more proactive engagement on the part of the 
political authorities at the highest level of responsibility, would increase their confidence and 
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